The information ratio of a secret sharing scheme Σ measures the size of the largest share of the scheme, and is denoted by σ(Σ). The optimal information ratio of an access structure Γ is the infimum of σ(Σ) among all schemes Σ for Γ, and is denoted by σ(Γ). The main result of this work is that for every two access structures Γ and Γ , |σ(Γ) − σ(Γ )| ≤ |Γ ∪ Γ | − |Γ ∩ Γ |. We prove it constructively. Given any secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ, we present a method to construct a secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ that satisfies that σ(Σ ) ≤ σ(Σ) + |Γ ∪ Γ | − |Γ ∩ Γ |. As a consequence of this result, we see that close access structures admit secret sharing schemes with similar information ratio. We show that this property is also true for particular families of secret sharing schemes and models of computation, like the family of linear secret sharing schemes, span programs, Boolean formulas and circuits.
Introduction
Secret sharing is a cryptographic primitive that is used to protect a secret value by distributing it into shares. Secret sharing is used to prevent both the disclosure and the loss of secrets. In the typical scenario, each share is sent privately to a different participant. Then a subset of participants is authorized if their shares determine the secret value, and forbidden if their shares do not contain any information on the secret value. The family of authorized subsets is monotone increasing, and it is called the access structure of the scheme. If every subset of participants is either authorized or forbidden, we say that the scheme is perfect. In this work we just consider perfect secret sharing schemes that are information-theoretically secure, that is, schemes whose security does not rely on any computational assumption.
Secret sharing schemes were introduced by Shamir [41] and Blakley [10] in 1979, and are used in many cryptographic applications such as secure multiparty computation, attribute-based encryption and distributed cryptography (see [3] for more details). These applications require the use of efficient secret sharing schemes. Namely, schemes with short shares, efficient generation of the shares, and efficient reconstruction of the secret. The information ratio of a secret sharing scheme Σ is the ratio of the maximum length in bits of the shares to the length of the secret value, and we denote it by σ(Σ). The information ratio is widely used as a measure of the efficiency of secret sharing schemes. Linear secret sharing schemes are of particular interest because they have homomorphic properties, and because the shares are generated by using linear mappings, simplifying the generation of shares and the reconstruction of the secret.
Ito, Saito and Nishizeki [26] presented a method to construct a secret sharing scheme for any monotone increasing family of subsets. Viewing access structures as monotone Boolean functions, Benaloh and Leichter [9] presented a method to construct a secret sharing scheme from any monotone Boolean formula. However, for almost all access structures, the information ratios of the schemes constructed using these and other general methods [9, 26, 31] are exponential on the number of participants. In order to understand the length of shares required to realize an access structure Γ, we define the optimal information ratio of Γ as the infimum of the information ratios of all the secret sharing schemes for Γ, and we denote it by σ(Γ).
The computation of the optimal information ratio of access structures is difficult, in general, and concrete values are known only for certain families of access structures, like particular families of multipartite access structures (e.g. [12, 19, 20] ), access structures with a small number of participants (e.g. [36] ), or access structures with small minimal sets (e.g. [16] ). A common method to obtain bounds for this parameter is to define random variables associated to the shares and to the secret, and then apply the information inequalities of the Shannon entropy of these random variables. Csirmaz [15] used a connection between the Shannon entropy and polymatroids to develop a technique for finding lower bounds. Using this technique, it was possible to find an access structure with n participants for which the optimal information ratio is Ω(n/ log(n)). Currently, it is the best lower bound on the information ratio for an access structure.
Monotone span programs over a finite field F are equivalent to linear secret sharing schemes with secret in F [3, 31] . This connection was very useful to extend bounds on the complexity of monotone span programs to bounds on the information ratio of linear secret sharing schemes. Robere et al. [39] showed that there is an access structure that requires linear schemes of information ratio 2 Ω(n 1/14 log(n)) .
For every perfect secret sharing scheme, the information ratio must be at least 1. The schemes that attain this bound are called ideal, and their access structures are also called ideal. Brickell and Davenport [13] showed that the access structure of ideal secret sharing schemes determines a matroid. Conversely, entropic matroids determine ideal access structures, but a little is known about the access structures associated to other families of matroids. The connection between ideal access structures and matroids is a powerful tool to characterize families of ideal access structures, e.g. [19] , and it allows to transform secret sharing problems into combinatorial ones.
Beyond this connection, we lack of general criteria to determine if an access structure admits an efficient scheme. For instance, we lack of a criterion to determine if an access structure admits secret sharing scheme with information ratio at most r, for some r > 1. Moreover, we do not know general properties of the family of access structures admitting efficient schemes. For other models of secret sharing, recent works provided interesting results on the characterization of the structures accepting efficient schemes [32, 42] , but it is not clear how to extend them to the perfect model.
The main objective of this work is to find properties of the access structures that admit efficient secret sharing schemes. The specific question we consider is to know whether access structures that are close admit secret sharing schemes with similar information ratios. Namely, the objective is to bound the difference between the optimal information ratios of access structures that differ on a small number of subsets. Answers to this question will help to understand the limitations of secret sharing and the behavior of the optimal information ratio, as a function from the set of all the access structures with a positive number of participants to the real numbers.
Our main result is that |σ(Γ) − σ(Γ )| ≤ |Γ ∪ Γ | − |Γ ∩ Γ | for every two access structures Γ and Γ . The proof of this result is constructive. Given any secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ, we can construct a secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ that satisfies σ(Σ ) ≤ σ(Σ) + |Γ ∪ Γ | − |Γ ∩ Γ |. Moreover, if Σ is linear, then Σ is linear too. The construction relies on a combinatorial result that allows a description of Γ as the union and the intersection of Γ and other access structures of a particular kind. Then, using an extension of the techniques of Benaloh and Leichter [9] , we generate secret sharing schemes for the desired access structure.
An immediate consequence of this bound is that the access structures that are close to access structures with efficient secret sharing schemes also admit efficient schemes, and the access structures that are close to access structures requiring large shares, also require large shares. This bound also has consequences on cryptographic schemes and protocols that use secret sharing. For instance, using the results in [17] , we see that close Q 2 adversary structures admit secure multiparty computation protocols of similar complexity, in the passive adversary case. In the context of access control, for similar policies, we can build attribute-based encryption schemes of similar complexity [25] .
Using the common terminology for functions between metric spaces, we can say that the optimal information ratio is a Lipschitz function with constant 1. Moreover, we prove that this constant is optimal, that is, σ is not Lipschitz for any constant smaller than 1.
By taking advantage of the combinatorial nature of our main result, we extend this bound to other models of computation. We are able to bound the formula size, the circuit size, and the monotone span program size for monotone Boolean functions, obtaining analogous results. In order to understand this property, we also analyze the limitations of the techniques for finding lower bounds on the information ratio. We study the nature of the bounds based on the Shannon inequalities [15, 33] , the Razborov's rank method [37] , the subcritical families method [4] , and submodular formal complexity measures. We describe the behavior of these bounds when we add or delete subsets from an access structure.
The search for bounds on the information ratios of close access structures was motivated by a work by Beimel, Farràs and Mintz [5] . They presented a method that, given a secret sharing scheme Σ for an access structure Γ and an access structure Γ with Γ ⊆ Γ and min Γ ⊆ min Γ, provides a secret sharing scheme for Γ (where min Γ stands for the family of minimal subsets of Γ). They showed that if Γ and Γ are graph access structures and dist(min Γ, min Γ ) is small, and Σ is efficient then the new scheme is also efficient. We also revise one of these techniques and we provide an alternative general combinatorial formulation of a result in [5] that can also be extended to other models of computation.
In Section 2 we define secret sharing, and in Section 3 we show preliminary results about secret sharing and access structures. Section 4 is dedicated to the main bound on the information ratio of secret sharing schemes. In Sections 4 and 5, we present the secret sharing constructions used for bounding the optimal information ratio. In Sections 6 and 7 we analyze the existing techniques for finding lower bounds on the information ratio. Finally, we present in Section 8 the results for formulas and circuits. We moved the proofs that are not essential for the understanding of the principal results to the Appendices A, B, C and D.
Definition of Secret Sharing
This work is dedicated to unconditionally secure secret sharing schemes. In this section we define access structure, secret sharing scheme, and we present the complexity measures used in this work. The definition of secret sharing is from [3] . For an introduction to secret sharing, see [3, 35] , for example. Definition 2.1 (Access Structure). Let P be a set. A collection Γ ⊆ P(P ) is monotone if B ∈ Γ and B ⊆ C ⊆ P implies C ∈ Γ. An access structure is a monotone collection Γ ⊆ P(P ) of non-empty subsets of P . The family of minimal subsets in Γ is denoted by min Γ. Definition 2.2 (Distribution Scheme). Let P = {1, . . . , n} and let K be a finite set. A distribution scheme on P with domain of secrets K is a pair Σ = (Π, µ), where µ is a probability distribution on a finite set R, and Π is a mapping from K × R to a set of n-tuples K 1 × K 2 × · · · × K n . The set R is called the set of random strings and K j is called the domain of shares of j.
For a distribution scheme (Π, µ) and for any A ⊆ P , we denote Π(s, r) A as the projection of Π(s, r) to its A-entries. Definition 2.3 (Secret Sharing). Let K be a finite set of secrets with |K| ≥ 2. A distribution scheme (Π, µ) on P with domain of secrets K is a secret-sharing scheme realizing an access structure Γ if the following two requirements hold for every A ⊆ P :
• If A ∈ Γ, then there exists a reconstruction function Recon A :
• If A / ∈ Γ, then for every a, b ∈ K, and for every possible vector of shares (s j ) j∈A ,
In a secret sharing scheme, usually we consider that there is an additional player p 0 not in P called the dealer. The dealer distributes a secret k ∈ K according to Σ by first sampling a random string r ∈ R according to µ, computing a vector of shares Π(k, r) = (s 1 , . . . , s n ), and privately communicating each share s j to party j. The subsets of participants in P satisfying condition (1) are called authorized, and the ones satisfying condition (2) are called forbidden. In this work we just consider perfect secret sharing schemes, that is, schemes in which every subset of participants is authorized or forbidden.
Definition 2.4 (Linear Secret Sharing Scheme). Let F be a finite field. A secret sharing scheme Σ = (Π, µ) is (F, )-linear if K = F , the sets R, K 1 , . . ., K n are vector spaces over F, µ is the uniform distribution on R, and Π is a surjective linear mapping.
For a secret sharing scheme Σ on P , the information ratio of Σ is
and the total information ratio of Σ is
We say that Σ is ideal if σ(Σ) = 1. In this case, we say that its access structure is ideal as well.
For an access structure Γ, we define the optimal information ratio σ(Γ) as the infimum of the information ratio of secret sharing schemes for Γ. Also, we define the optimal total information ratio σ T (Γ) as the infimum of the total information ratio of the secret sharing schemes for Γ. Analogously, for every power of a prime q we define λ q, (Γ) and λ T q, (Γ) as the infimum of the information ratios and total information ratios of the (F q , )-linear secret sharing schemes for Γ, respectively.
Preliminaries
First we introduce some notation on access structures and we recall some of their properties. We use some definitions that are common in extremal combinatorics. See [24] for more details.
Let P be a set. We define the distance between B, B ⊆ P(P ) as
which is the size of the symmetric difference of the two sets. All through this paper, we measure the closeness between families of subsets by this distance. Observe that dist(B, B ) = |B \ B | + |B \ B|. A family of subsets B ⊆ P(P ) is an antichain if A B for every A, B ∈ B. For any B ⊆ P(P ) we define min B and max B as the families of minimal and maximal subsets in B, respectively. Both min B and max B are antichains. We define the complementary of B as B c = P(P ) \ B, and for every i ∈ P we define B(i) = {A \ {i} : i ∈ A ∈ B}. The degree of i ∈ P in B, denoted by deg i B, is defined as the number of subsets in B containing i. For every set A ⊆ P , we define the closure of a set A as cl(A) = {A ∪ B : B ⊆ P \ A}. We also define the closure of B as cl(B) = ∪ A∈B cl(A). The closure of any family of subsets is monotone increasing, and so it is an access structure. A family of subsets B ⊆ P(P ) is an access structure if and only if cl(B) = B. If Γ is an access structure, then cl(min Γ) = Γ and Γ c is monotone decreasing. For an access structure Γ on P , we define its dual as Γ * = {P \A : A ⊆ P, A / ∈ Γ}. For any two access structures Γ and Γ , (Γ∪Γ ) * = Γ * ∩Γ * . The minimal authorized subsets of Γ * are in correspondence with the maximal subsets not in Γ and vice versa: min Γ * = {P \ B : B ∈ max Γ c } and max(Γ * c ) = {P \ A : A ∈ min Γ}. Hence Γ * * = Γ. For any two access structures Γ and Γ , (Γ ∪ Γ )
Some Families of Ideal Access Structures
Now we define three parametrized families of access structures. As we show below, these access structures admit short formulas and ideal secret sharing schemes. For any A ⊆ P , we define the access structures
The access structure T A is the smallest access structure that contains A, and it is usually called the trivial access structure for A. The access structure S A is T A minus {A}, and min S A = {A ∪ {p} : p ∈ P \ A} is the sunflower of A [24] . The access structure F A is the biggest access structure not containing A, and it has just one maximal forbidden subset, that is A. Its minimal access structure is min F A = {{i} : i / ∈ A}. Observe that F A = T * P \A . Now we present secret sharing schemes for the families of access structures F A , S A and T A introduced above, for A ⊆ P , A = ∅. The secret sharing schemes we present are ideal and are valid for any finite set of secrets K with |K| ≥ 2. Moreover, if K = F for some finite field F, then we show that these access structures also admit ideal (K, )-linear secret sharing schemes.
Let K = {a 0 , . . . , a m−1 } be a set of size m ≥ 2. For the constructions we present below, we assume that K is a ring. In the case that K is not a ring, we will consider the bijection between K and Z m , the construction will be defined over Z m . Without loss of generality, let P = {1, . . . , n} and A = {1, . . . , t} for some t < n.
• F A : Since min F A = {{i} : i / ∈ A}, the participants in A are not relevant, and so we just need to define the shares of the participants in P \ A. Consider K j = ∅ for j ∈ A and K j = K for j ∈ P \ A. In this case there is no need for randomness. A secret sharing scheme for F A is defined by the mapping Π with Π(k) j = k for t + 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
• S A : Consider K j = K for j = 1, . . . , n, and µ the uniform distribution on R = K t .
A secret sharing scheme for S A is defined by the mapping Π with Π(k, r) j = r j for 1 ≤ j ≤ t and Π(k, r)
Observe that adapting this scheme we can construct an ideal secret sharing for any access structure Γ with min Γ ⊆ min S A .
• T A : Since min T A = {A}, we just need to define the shares of the participants in A. Consider K j = K for j ∈ A, K j = ∅ for j ∈ P \ A, and µ the uniform distribution on R = K t−1 . A secret sharing scheme for T A is defined by the mapping Π with Π(k, r) j = r j for 1 ≤ j < t and Π(k, r) t = k − t−1 i=1 r i . For A = P , we can construct an analogous scheme.
Given a secret sharing scheme Σ on P , we define Σ| A as the secret sharing scheme on P in which only the participants in A receive the shares from Σ. The access structure of Σ| A on P is Γ| A = {B ⊆ P : B ∩ A ∈ Γ}, and min(Γ| A ) = {B ∈ min Γ : B ⊆ A}.
ANDs and ORs of Secret Sharing Schemes
Benaloh and Leichter [9] presented a general construction for secret sharing. Given an access structure Γ, we can define the Boolean function f : P(P ) → {0, 1} satisfying f (A) = 1 if and only if A ∈ Γ. This function is monotone increasing. Given a monotone Boolean formula computing f , it is possible to construct a linear secret sharing scheme for Γ by just translating ANDs and ORs into secret sharing operations [9] .
Here we consider the operands of Benaloh and Leichter with all generality, allowing the composition of arbitrary secret sharing schemes. These operations represent two natural settings. Roughly speaking, the OR of two schemes Σ 1 and Σ 2 is a scheme in which the same secret is shared independently by using Σ 1 and Σ 2 . In the case of the AND operation, the secret s is split into r and s + r, where r is a random value in K, and then the r is shared by means of Σ 1 and r + s is shared independently by means of Σ 2 . In [9] , the operations are used to construct a linear scheme. In this work, we consider ANDs and ORs between any secret sharing schemes with the same set of secrets. Therefore, we prefer to present all the details about these operations. The proof in Lemma 3.1 has the same spirit as the one in [9] , but we show it for the sake of completeness.
Let Σ 1 = (Π 1 , µ 1 ) and Σ 2 = (Π 2 , µ 2 ) be two secret sharing schemes on a set of participants P that have the same domain of secrets K, satisfying that µ 1 and µ 2 are independent probability distributions on some finite sets R 1 and R 2 , and let
We define the OR of Σ 1 and Σ 2 as the secret sharing scheme
. . , n, and
for i = 1, . . . , n; and µ is the product of µ 1 and µ 2 . Now we define the AND of Σ 1 and Σ 2 . We need to introduce an additional scheme. Let Σ 3 = (Π 3 , µ 3 ) be the ideal secret sharing scheme on P = {1, 2} with access structure Γ = T P = {P } described above, with domain of secrets K, set of random strings R 3 = K, and uniform probability distribution µ 3 on K. The AND of Σ 1 and Σ 2 is the secret sharing scheme
for i = 1, . . . , n; and µ is the product of µ 1 , µ 2 , and µ 3 .
Lemma 3.1. Let Σ 1 and Σ 2 be two secret sharing schemes on the same set of participants and with the same set of secrets. Let Γ 1 and Γ 2 be their access structures, respectively. Then the access structures of the schemes
A and Recon
3
A be the reconstruction functions of the schemes Σ 1 , Σ 2 and Σ 3 , respectively. First we prove that the access structure of
A over the elements from Σ 2 . Then subsets in Γ 1 ∪ Γ 2 can recover the secret. If A / ∈ Γ 1 and A / ∈ Γ 2 , then A is forbidden in Σ 1 ∧ Σ 2 , because for every a, b ∈ K and for every possible vector of shares
Now we prove that the access structure of Σ 1 ∧Σ 2 is Γ 1 ∩Γ 2 . For a subset A ∈ Γ 1 ∩Γ 2 , we define reconstruct the secret by applying Recon 
For every a, b ∈ K and for every possible vector of shares (
and so A is forbidden. For A ∈ Γ 2 \ Γ 1 the proof is analogous, and for A / ∈ Γ 2 ∩ Γ 1 the proof is immediate.
In both cases, each participant receives a share from Σ 1 and a share from Σ 2 , so σ(
. Therefore, for every two access structures Γ 1 and Γ 2 , σ(Γ 1 ∪ Γ 2 ) and σ(Γ 1 ∩ Γ 2 ) are smaller than or equal to σ(Γ 1 ) + σ(Γ 2 ). Both operations preserve linearity. That is, if Σ 1 and Σ 2 are (F, )-linear secret sharing scheme for a finite field F and > 0, then Σ 1 ∨ Σ 2 and Σ 1 ∧ Σ 2 are also (F, )-linear. Now we present a well known construction for every access structure [26] . Consider the secret sharing schemes for the access structures T A for any A ∈ min Γ, and then define Σ as the OR of these schemes. We obtain a scheme with σ(Σ) = deg(min Γ). If we describe Γ as (Γ * ) * = (∪ A∈max Γ c T P \A ) * = ∩ A∈max Γ c F A we obtain a description in terms of ANDs of access structures [26] . Then we can construct a secret sharing scheme Σ with σ(Σ) = deg(max Γ c ).
Remark 3.2. All the results in this section can be adapted to other kinds of secret sharing schemes: statistical secret sharing schemes (see [3] ), computational secret sharing schemes (see [8] ), and perfect secret sharing schemes defined using the entropy function (see Definition B.1). The AND and OR operations can also be defined in these models, but with additional restrictions, in some cases (see Section B for more details).
The Main Result
We dedicate this section to the proof and the analysis of the main result of this work, which is the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Let Γ, Γ be two access structures on a set P . Then
The approach we follow to give an upper bound for |σ(Γ) − σ(Γ )| for any two access structures Γ and Γ is the following. Given a secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ, we show a way to construct a secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ with σ(Σ ) ≤ σ(Σ) + dist(Γ, Γ ). In order to do so, we find a description of Γ in terms of Γ and some ideal access structures, which is presented in Lemma 4.2. Then, according to this description, we can construct Σ reusing Σ in a special form, according to the description of Γ . This theorem is a direct consequence of Proposition 4.3.
The motivation for reusing Σ in the construction of Σ is that, if Γ and Γ are close, Σ already satisfies most of the reconstruction and privacy requirements we need for Σ . Our construction is an elegant method to delete subsets from Γ, that is, to find a solution for the case Γ ⊆ Γ. In this situation, we have to revoke the right of some subsets in Γ to know the secret in Σ.
Lemma 4.2. Let Γ, Γ be two access structures on P . Then
First, consider the following two cases:
Suppose that Γ is not contained in Γ and vice versa. Then consider their intersection and observe that Γ ∩ Γ ⊆ Γ. Following the arguments used above in case 2 we obtain that
following the arguments used above in case 1 we obtain that
It concludes the proof.
Proof. Let Σ be a secret sharing scheme for Γ. By Lemma 4.2, the access structure Γ is realized by the secret sharing scheme
where Σ F A and Σ T A are the ideal secret sharing schemes described above for F A and
In the proof of the last theorem we construct a secret sharing scheme for Γ using ANDs and ORs of a scheme for Γ and schemes for access structures of the kind T A and F A . These access structures admit ideal schemes for any set of secrets. Therefore, this result is also valid if we restrict ourselves to the secret sharing schemes for a particular size of the secret. For instance, for secret sharing schemes sharing one bit. In addition, these access structures also admit ideal (F, )-linear secret sharing schemes for any finite field F, for any A and any > 0. Hence if we have a (F, )-linear secret sharing scheme for Γ then we obtain a (F, )-linear secret sharing scheme for Γ .
Corollary 4.4. Let Γ, Γ be two access structures, and let F q be a finite field. For every
As a consequence of the previous results, the access structures that are close to access structures with efficient secret sharing schemes also admit efficient schemes, and the access structures that are close to access structures requiring large shares, also require large shares.
In some applications of secret sharing schemes, the setting defines two families of subsets A and B, and requires the subsets in A to be forbidden, and subsets in B to be authorized. If B ∪ A = 2 P , then there is a certain degree of freedom when choosing the scheme. The number of subsets that are not required to be authorized or forbidden is 2 P − (|B| + |A|). If we know the optimal information ratio for an access structure Γ satisfying this property, then we know that the smallest information ratio of the schemes with this property is at least σ(Γ) + 2 P − (|B| + |A|).
The Lipschitz constant of the optimal information ratio
In the next example we show that for distance equal to one, it is not possible to improve the general bound in Theorem 4.1 and in Corollary 4.4. We present access structures Γ n , Γ n and Γ n with dist(Γ n , Γ n ) = dist(Γ n , Γ n ) = 1 and with |σ(
Until now, we did not find examples of access structures whose distance is greater than one attaining the bound.
Example 4.5. Consider the access structures Γ n and Γ n on P = {1, . . . , n} with min Γ n = {{1, i} : 2 ≤ i ≤ n} and min Γ n = {{1}, {2, . . . , n}}. These access structures admit ideal secret sharing schemes for every set of secrets, and ideal linear secret sharing schemes for any finite field F. Now consider the access structures Γ n with min Γ n = {{1, i} : 2 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {{2, . . . , n}}. Observe that Γ n = Γ n ∪ {{2, . . . , n}} = Γ n \ {{1}}, and so dist(Γ n , Γ n ) = dist(Γ n , Γ n ) = 1. By Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.4 σ(Γ n ) ≤ 2 and λ(Γ n ) ≤ 2. It was proved in [20] 
Now we will use the notion of Lipschitz continuity to describe the properties of the optimal information ratio. Let f : X → Y be a function mapping a metric space (X, d X ) to a metric space (Y, d Y ), where d X and d Y denote the distance functions on the domain X and in the range Y , respectively. We say that f has Lipschitz constant
for every x, y ∈ X. In this case we also say that f is k-Lipschitz.
In the context of this work, we view the information ratio σ as a function whose domain is the set M of all access structures on P = {1, . . . , n} for n > 1, and the range is R ≥1 . Observe that (M, dist) is a metric space, and that it is not known what are the values of R ≥1 that have a preimage. Then we can state the following result, which is in fact equivalent to Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.6. The optimal information ratio is 1-Lipschitz.
By the Example 4.5, the Lipschitz constant of σ cannot be smaller than one. Usually, the notion of Lipschitz it is used in continuous domains, but it has been also used for discrete domains. For instance, in the study of differential privacy (for example [28] ). Continuity in a discrete domain does not make sense, but the Lipschitz property provides a valuable information about the sensitivity of the function when we vary the input. In this case, it illustrates that close access structures have similar information ratio. Therefore, in M we have regions in which the access structures admit secret sharing schemes with low information ratio, for instance around ideal access structures. The distribution of these regions and their density in M is an open problem.
Asymptotic behavior
Our work is focussed in the local behavior of the optimal information ratio, and the results in this works were motivated by the study of the optimal information ratio of access structures that are close. In this subsection we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the optimal information ratio, and the convenience of bounding the difference between the optimal information ratio of two access structures by the distance between them.
We presented above examples of access structures that are at a distance one and the difference between their optimal information ratio tends to one. For distance greater than one, we did not find an equivalent result. The main difficulty is that, in the non-ideal case, we do not know exact values of σ, in general. However, we show some examples that suggest that our bounds are still useful for large distances, in general.
First we analyze Proposition 4.3. Let f : N → R be a function that |σ(Γ) − σ(Γ )| ≤ f (r), where r = | max(Γ \ Γ )| + | min(Γ \ Γ)|) for every two access structures Γ and Γ . In order to find a lower bound on f , we consider a well known family of access structures defined by Csirmaz in [15] , that we call F. For every Γ in F, σ(Γ) = Ω(n/ log n), where n is the number of participants, and n = N + log N , where N is the number of minimal authorized subsets.
If we take Γ to be the empty access structure and we take Γ to be in F, then we see
Hence we obtain the restriction that f (r) = Ω(r/ log r). Therefore, if it is possible to improve the bound in Proposition 4.3, then it can only be improved by a logarithmic factor. Now we analyze Corollary 4.4. Let F q be a finite field, a positive integer, and let g : N → R be a function that, for every two access structures Γ and Γ , satisfies
. Let H be the family of access structures on a set of n participants, n odd, in which all subsets of size greater than n/2 are authorized, and the ones of size smaller than n/2 are forbidden. There are 2 ( n n/2 ) access structures in H, including the n/2-threshold access structure. Observe that for every access structure in H, half of the access structures in H are at a distance greater than or equal to n n/2 /2. Linear secret sharing schemes can be represented by matrices (see [3, 35] , for example). In a (F q , )-linear secret sharing scheme with information ratio s, each participant is associated to at most s rows. We can assume that the rows associated to the dealer are fixed. Then we have at most s n + rows. The number of columns is at most the number of rows minus , because the set P must be authorized. Hence the number of matrices of this kind is q s 2 2 n 2 . Then the number of access structures Γ with λ q, (Γ) ≤ s is smaller than q s 2 2 n 2 . Now we take s = 2 n/2−1 n 5/4 √ log q .
Using the property that
, if we compare q s 2 2 n 2 with 2 ( n n/2 ) , we see that almost all access structures Γ in H satisfy λ q, (Γ) ≥ s. This counting argument is similar to the one in [2] . We take Γ to be the n/2-threshold access structure. Then there exists Γ in H with λ q, (Γ ) ≥ s at a distance d = dist(Γ, Γ ), where n n/2 /2 ≤ d ≤ n n/2 . These access structures satisfy
Hence we obtain the restriction that
Therefore, in the case that |λ q, (Γ) − λ q, (Γ )| admits a sublinear bound in d, it will be a polynomial of degree at least 1/2.
More Local Bounds for the Optimal Information Ratio
In the previous section, we presented a way to describe an access structure Γ in terms of another one Γ. This combinatorial result was used to construct, given a secret sharing scheme for Γ, a secret sharing scheme for Γ .
In this section we present constructions of secret sharing schemes that follow the same strategy, but using different combinatorial results. As in the previous section, we are able to provide bounds on the optimal information ratio of access structures. These bounds are useful for access structures whose minimal access structures are in a special disposition. We use combinatorial results that are different from the ones presented in the previous section. In particular, the results are based on a new notion of (B 1 , B 2 )-covering, which will be used to construct secret sharing schemes. The interest of using (B 1 , B 2 )-covering is that we can transform the problem of finding an efficient scheme into the search of small coverings, and so translate a secret sharing problem into a combinatorial one.
(B 1 , B 2 )-coverings
Next we introduce a notion of covering that will be used to find useful descriptions of minimal access structures that are close.
Definition 5.1. Let B 1 , B 2 ⊆ P(P ) be two families of subsets satisfying B 1 ∩ B 2 = ∅. A family of subsets C ⊆ P(P ) is a (B 1 , B 2 )-covering if it satisfies the following properties:
1. for every A ∈ B 1 and for every B ∈ C, A B, and 2. for every A ∈ B 2 there exists B ∈ C such that A ⊆ B.
Example 5.2. Let B ⊆ P(P ) be an antichain and let A ∈ B. Then C = {P \ {i} : i ∈ A} is a ({A}, B \ {A}) − covering.
Next
Proof. Let C be a (B 1 , B 2 )-covering. For every A ∈ B 1 and B ∈ B 2 , cl(A) ∩ C = ∅ and cl(B) ∩ C = ∅, so A B. Conversely, if A B for every A ∈ B 1 and B ∈ B 2 , then B 2 is a (B 1 , B 2 )-covering.
Beimel, Farràs and Mintz constructed efficient secret sharing schemes for very dense graphs [5] . Some of the constructions have been recently improved in [6] .
We include its proof in the appendix, because is very similar to the proofs in [5] .
This result has also consequences in graph theory, which corresponds to the case k = 2. It implies that every graph G = (V, E) with E ⊆ P 2 admits an equivalence cover of degree 16d ln n, where d is the degree of P 2 \ E (see [5] for more details). The next proposition is the result we will use to construct formulas, circuits, and secret sharing schemes for access structures. Proof. For every subset A ∈ min Γ , there exists B ∈ C with A ⊆ B. For every A ∈ min Γ \ min Γ , A B for every B ∈ C, and so the equality holds.
Secret Sharing Constructions Using Coverings
The main result of this subsection is Theorem 5.9. The quality of the bounds in this theorem depends on the degree of a covering. In Lemma 5.4, we provide a bound on the degree of coverings. In Example 5.10, we show an access structure for which this technique provides an optimal secret sharing scheme.
Lemma 5.6. Let Γ, Γ be two access structures with min Γ ⊆ min Γ . Let Σ be a secret sharing scheme for Γ. Then there exists a secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ with
Proof. By Lemma 4.2, the secret sharing scheme Σ = Σ ∨ Σ realizes Γ , where
Lemma 5.7. Let Γ, Γ be two access structures with min Γ ⊆ min Γ. Let Σ be a secret sharing scheme for Γ. If there exists a (min Γ \ min Γ , min Γ )-covering of degree d, then there exists a secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ with
Proof. Let C be a (min Γ \ min Γ , min Γ )-covering of degree d. We define a secret sharing scheme Σ as the OR of all the secret sharing schemes Σ| B for B ∈ C. By Proposition 5.5, Σ realizes Γ . In this scheme, each i ∈ P receives deg i (C) shares. Since
Example 5.8. Let Γ, Γ be two access structures with dist(min Γ, min Γ ) = 1 and min Γ ⊆ min Γ. As we saw in Example 5.2, there exists a (min Γ \ min Γ , min Γ )-covering C of degree at most n − 1. Hence given a secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ we can construct a secret sharing scheme for Γ whose information ratio is less than (n − 1)σ(Σ).
Theorem 5.9. Let Γ, Γ be two access structures on P . If there exists a (min Γ \ min Γ , min Γ )-covering of degree d, then
Proof. Let Γ be the access structure defined by min Γ = min Γ ∩ min Γ. Observe that min Γ \ min Γ = min Γ \ min Γ , and that every (min Γ \ min Γ , min Γ )-covering is also a (min Γ \ min Γ , min Γ )-covering by Lemma A.1. Given a secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ, there is a secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ with σ(Σ ) ≤ dσ(Σ) by Lemma 5.7. Then, using Lemma 5.6 we obtain a secret sharing scheme for Γ of the desired total information ratio.
Example 5.10. Let P be a set of n = 2 + 1 participants for some > 0, P = {a, b 0 , . . . , b −1 , c 0 , . . . , c −1 }. Let Γ be the 2-threshold access structure on P and let Γ be the access structure on P with min Γ = {{p, q} ⊆ P } \ {{a, c i } : 0
}} is a (min Γ \ min Γ , min Γ )-covering. Using the construction described in Lemma 5.7, we obtain that Σ = Σ| C 1 ∨ Σ| C 2 is a secret sharing scheme for Γ . It satisfies σ T (Σ ) = σ T (Σ| C 1 ) + σ T (Σ| C 2 ) = + 1 + 2 = 3 + 1. By [5, Theorem 7.1], σ T (Γ) ≥ n + = 3 + 1. Therefore σ T (Γ ) = n + .
A Construction Using Sunflowers
In Proposition 5.12, we present another secret sharing construction that follows a procedure analogous to the one in Theorem 4.1, but using a different description of the access structures.
Lemma 5.11. Let Γ, Γ be two access structures on P . LetΓ be the access structure with minΓ = (min Γ) ∩ Γ . Then
Proof. Let Γ = Γ ∩ Γ . According to Lemma 4.2, we can describe Γ as Γ = Γ ∪ A∈min(Γ \Γ) T A . We dedicate the rest of the proof to show that Γ =Γ ∪ A∈Γ\Γ cl((min S A ) ∩ Γ ). Since Γ = min Γ ∪ A∈Γ min S A , we have that
We claim that Γ =Γ ∪ A 1 . First, we prove that A 3 ⊆ A 2 , and then we prove that A 2 ⊆Γ ∪ A 1 . For every B ∈ B 3 there exists a set B ∈ B 2 satisfying B ⊆ cl(B ). In this situation, cl(min S B ) ⊆ cl(min S B ). Taking into account that (min S A ) ∩ Γ = min S A for every A ∈ B 2 ∪ B 3 , we obtain A 3 ⊆ A 2 .
Let A ∈ B 2 . If A ∈ min Γ, then A ∈Γ because B 2 ⊆ Γ , and so min S A ⊆Γ. Suppose that A / ∈ min Γ. Then there exists B ∈ Γ satisfying A ∈ min S B , and in
. Therefore A 2 ⊆Γ ∪ A 1 , which concludes the proof.
Proposition 5.12. Let Γ, Γ be two access structures. LetΓ be the access structure with minΓ = (min Γ) ∩ Γ . Then
Proof. Let Σ andΣ be secret sharing schemes for Γ andΓ, respectively. We use Lemma 5.11 to construct a secret sharing scheme for Γ . Observe that for every A ∈ Γ, (min S A ) ∩ Γ ⊆ min S A . Hence, using the scheme described above for S A we can construct an ideal secret sharing scheme cl((min S A ) ∩ Γ ), which we call Σ A . Then the access structure Γ is realized by the secret sharing scheme
where Σ T A is an ideal secret sharing scheme for
Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 5.12 are based on constructions of the same spirit, but they cannot be compared, in general. The bound on the optimal information ratio in Theorem 4.1 is clearer than the one in Proposition 5.12. However, there are cases in which the latter is better, as in the following example.
Example 5.13. Consider the access structures Γ n on P = {1, . . . , n} with min Γ n = {{1, i} : 2 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {{2, . . . , n − 1}} for n > 3. Now consider Γ n = Γ n \ {2, . . . , n − 1}. In this example, we show that in this situation the construction in Proposition 5.12 is better than the one in Theorem 4.1.
We apply Proposition 5.12. We have minΓ n = (min Γ n ) ∩ Γ n = {{1, i} : 2 ≤ i ≤ n}. As we discussed in Example 4.5, this access structure is ideal, and so σ(Γ n ) = 1, obtaining that σ(Γ n ) ≤ 1 + 1 = 2. Also, observe that Γ n coincides with the access structure Γ n defined in Example 4.5, and so σ(Γ n ) = 2 − 1/(n − 2). Now we compute a bound on the optimal information ratio of Γ n . If we restrict Γ n to the set {1, . . . , n − 1} we obtain the access structure Γ n−1 , so σ(Γ n ) ≥ 2 − 1/(n − 3). It is also easy to find a construction for Γ n with information ratio 2, using the techniques in [20] . Hence we know that 2 − 1/(n − 3) ≤ σ(Γ n ) ≤ 2. Using Theorem 4.1 to bound σ(Γ n ) we would have obtained σ(Γ n ) ≤ σ(Γ n ) + 1 ≤ 3, which is less accurate.
Lower Bounds on the Information Ratio
In this section and in the following one, we study techniques for finding lower bounds on the information ratio. For these bounds, we analyze the effect of adding and deleting subsets in the access structure If we view the secret and the shares of a scheme as random variables, then we can compute the entropy of the secret and the shares. Then we can obtain bounds on the information ratio using the Shannon information inequalities and other information inequalities. For the sake of completeness, we present in Section B an alternative definition of secret sharing that defines the secret and the shares as random variables.
We study the lower bound on σ(Γ) introduced by Martí-Farré and Padró [33] , which is denoted by κ(Γ). The main result in this section is Theorem 6.7, which shows a property of κ that is analogous to the one in Theorem 4.1. The bound κ exploits the connection between secret sharing schemes and polymatroids, which is presented below. The value of κ for an access structure can also be obtained by requiring the Shannon inequalities on the entropies of the shares and the secret (see [15, 35] for more details).
We use notation introduced in [18, 34] to describe the polymatroids and the associated access structures. For a function F : P(Q) → R and subsets X, Y, Z ⊆ Q, we denote
and ∆ F (Y :Z) = ∆ F (Y :Z|∅). To simplify the notation, for x ∈ Q, we will write F (x) instead of F ({x}).
Definition 6.1. A polymatroid is a pair S = (Q, f ) formed by a finite set Q, the ground set, and a rank function f : P(Q) → R satisfying the following properties.
• f (∅) = 0.
• f is monotone increasing:
• f is submodular :
Additionally, if f (X) ≤ |X| for every X ⊆ Q and f is integer-valued, then we say that S is a matroid.
Proposition 6.2 ([18])
. A map f : P(Q) → R is the rank function of a polymatroid with ground set Q if and only if f (∅) = 0 and ∆ f (y:z|X) ≥ 0 for every X ⊆ Q and y, z ∈ Q \ X.
Now we describe the family of Γ-polymatroids for an access function Γ. These polymatroids are then used to compute κ(Γ). Definition 6.3. Let Γ be an access structure on P and let S = (Q, f ) be a polymatroid with Q = P ∪ {p 0 }. Then S is a Γ-polymatroid if for every A ⊆ P satisfies the following properties.
A Γ-polymatroid is said to be normalized if f (p 0 ) = 1.
Definition 6.4. For an access structure Γ on P we define κ(Γ) as the infimum of σ 0 (S) = max p∈P f (p) over all normalized Γ-polymatroids S = (Q, f ).
Theorem 6.5 ([33]). For every access structure Γ, σ(Γ) ≥ κ(Γ).
The main result in this section is Theorem 6.7. Its proof is constructive, and requires the construction of polymatroids for the union and the intersection of access structures. Below we define the AND and OR operations on polymatroids associated to access structures. We show in Lemma 6.6 that these operations are well defined and that the resulting polymatroids are associated to the intersection and union of access structures, respectively. The proof is rather tedious and so it is moved to Section C.
Let S 1 = (Q, f 1 ) and S 2 = (Q, f 2 ) be two normalized polymatroids. We define the normalized polymatroids
Lemma 6.6. Let Γ 1 and Γ 2 be two access structures on P . Let S 1 be a Γ 1 -polymatorid and S 2 a Γ 2 -polymatorid. Then S 1 ∨ S 2 is a Γ 1 ∪ Γ 2 -polymatroid, and S 1 ∧ S 2 is a Γ 1 ∩ Γ 2 -polymatroid. Theorem 6.7. Let Γ, Γ be two access structures on P . Then
The proof of this theorem is in Section C. It is constructive and uses the previous lemma. Roughly speaking, given a Γ-polymatroid, we compose it with polymatroids for other access structures and we obtain Γ -polymatroid.
An access structure Γ is a matroid port if there exists a Γ-polymatroid S that is a matroid. If Γ is a matroid port, then κ(Γ) = 1 [13, 33] . As a consequence of Theorem 6.7, the value of κ of access structures that are close to matroid ports is small. Martí-Farré and Padró [33] showed that if an access structure Γ is not a matroid port, then κ(Γ) ≥ 3/2 (see [33] for more details). We can also say that if an access structure Γ is not a matroid port and is at distance one of a matroid port, then 3/2 ≤ κ(Γ) ≤ 2. The access structures presented Example 4.5 have the property that σ and κ coincide. Hence, the κ function is also 1-Lipschitz.
Csirmaz [15] proved that κ(Γ) ≤ n for every access structure Γ, and found a family of access structures {Γ n } n≥0 with κ(Γ n ) ≥ O(n/ log n), but also proved that κ(Γ) ≤ n for every access structure Γ (see Section 4.2). Therefore, the previous theorem only provide useful bounds for access structures that are very close. However, it illustrates the nature of the optimization problems with restrictions derived from Shannon inequalities and the access structure, which may be interesting for other results of information theory. In particular, it shows that in order to find good lower bounds for κ, we have to study access structures that are far from matroids.
Recently, this method has been extended to non-Shannon inequalities, for instance in [7, 34] . For an access structure Γ on P and for a family of information inequalities or rank inequalities I, we define κ I (Γ) as the infimum of max x∈P f (p) over all normalized Γ-polymatroids satisfying the restrictions of I. An interesting problem is to study whether κ I behaves as κ.
Bounds for Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
For any finite field F, every (F, 1)-linear secret sharing scheme Σ is equivalent to a monotone span program of size σ T (Σ) (see [3] for more details). Since the bounds studied in this section are bounds on the total information ratio of (F, 1)-linear secret sharing schemes, we have the same results for the size of monotone span programs. Next we present a formulation of the Razborov's rank measure [37] that is adapted to the context of secret sharing and access structures.
Razborov's Rank Measure
Let Γ be an access structure, and let U, V ⊆ P(P ) be two families of subsets with U ⊆ Γ and V ⊆ Γ c . A (U, V )-rectangle is a Cartesian product U 0 × V 0 for which U 0 ⊆ U and V 0 ⊆ V . For each i ∈ P , define the rectangle R i = (U × V ) ∩ (T {i} × F {i} ). Denote the set of all such rectangles by R Γ (U, V ) = {R 1 , . . . , R n }.
Let F be a field and let A be any |U | × |V | matrix over F with rows indexed by elements of U and columns indexed by elements of V . The restriction of A to the rectangle R = U 0 × V 0 is the submatrix A R obtained by setting to 0 all entries not indexed by R.
Definition 7.1 ([37]
). Let Γ ⊆ P(P ) an access structure, U ⊆ Γ, V ⊆ Γ c . Let F be a field and let A be a |U | × |V | matrix over F. The rank measure of Γ with respect to A is given by
, and µ A (Γ) = 0 if rank(A) = 0.
Razborov [37] showed that the rank measure of a monotone Boolean function is a lower bound on the size of the shortest formula for this function (see Section 8) . Later, Gál [23] proved that the rank measure is also a lower bound on the size of monotone span programs. Taking into account the connection between monotone span programs and linear secret sharing schemes mentioned above, we obtain that the rank function is a lower bound on the optimal information ratio for linear secret sharing schemes. Namely, we have the following result. Theorem 7.2. Let Γ ⊆ P(P ) an access structure, U ⊆ Γ, V ⊆ Γ c . Let F q be a field and let A be a |U | × |V | matrix over F q . Then,
In the following theorem, we study the behavior of this bound when we add or delete subsets from an access structure. Theorem 7.3. Let Γ, Γ ⊆ P(P ) be access structures, U ⊆ Γ, V ⊆ Γ c . Fix a field F and let A be a |U | × |V | matrix over F. Then, there exist U , V ⊆ P(P ) and a |U | × |V | matrix A such that
Proof. Set U = U ∩ Γ and V = V ∩ Γ c , and let A be the restriction of A to U × V . Then, observe that |U \U | ≤ |Γ\Γ |, since U \U = U \Γ and U ⊆ Γ. Similarly, we see that |V \V | ≤ |Γ \Γ| by using Γ c \Γ c = Γ \Γ. Since A is the submatrix obtained by setting to 0 all entries of A indexed by U \U × V \V , we have rank(A) ≤ rank(A ) + |U \U | + |V \V |. Therefore
By using the previous inequalities, we see that
Theorem 7.4. Let Γ, Γ ⊆ P(P ) be access structures. Then
Proof. Let A be the |U | × |V | matrix such that µ(Γ) = µ A (Γ), and let A be the restriction of A to U × V , where U = U ∩ Γ and
Note that the behavior of the rank function bound is different from that of λ T q,1 . If we extend the bound on Corollary 4.4 to λ T we have that for every two access structures Γ and Γ , |λ T q, (Γ) − λ T q, (Γ )| ≤ n · dist(Γ, Γ ). Recently, in [39] , the rank function bound has been used to prove that there exists an access structure that requires linear schemes of information ratio 2 Ω(n 1/14 log(n)) . Currently, this is the best lower bound for linear secret sharing schemes.
Subcritical families
The next technique provides lower bounds on the size of the shares for linear secret sharing schemes. It was introduced in [4] . Definition 7.5. Let Γ be an access structure and let H ⊆ min Γ. We say that H is a critical subfamily for Γ, if every H ∈ H contains a set T H ⊆ H, |T H | ≥ 2, such that the following two conditions are satisfied 1. The set T H uniquely determines H in the subfamily H: No other set in H contains T H .
For any subset
Theorem 7.6. Let H be a critical subfamily of an access structure Γ. Then λ T (Γ) ≥ |H|.
Given a critical subfamily of an access structure Γ, it is easy to construct a critical subfamily for an access structure Γ obtained by deleting some authorized subsets or minimal authorized subsets from Γ. However, it is not easy to find a critical subfamily for access structures that are obtained by adding authorized subsets or minimal authorized subsets.
Lemma 7.7. Let H be the critical subfamily of an access structure Γ. Let Γ be access structures with min Γ ⊆ min Γ and | min Γ \ min Γ| = , and let Γ be an access structure with Γ ⊆ Γ and |Γ \ Γ | = . Then there exist two critical subfamilies H and H of Γ and Γ , respectively, with |H |, |H | ≥ |H| − .
Proof. The families of subsets H = H ∩ min Γ and H = H ∩ Γ are critical subfamilies of Γ and Γ , respectively.
Formulas and Circuits
In this section, we apply the approach of Section 4 to study the behavior of the complexity measures associated to monotone Boolean functions. Informally, our results show that similar monotone Boolean functions have close complexity measures. In particular, we aim to give similar bounds as those in Theorems 4.1 and 5.9 and Proposition 5.12 for the leafsize and the size of monotone Boolean functions. For an introduction to this area, see [30, 43] , for example.
Definitions
A Boolean function is a function of the form f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} for some n ≥ 1. We also see the domain of a Boolean function as the power set of P = {1, . . . , n} via the bijection {0, 1} n → P(P ) : (x i ) i∈P → {i ∈ P : x i = 1}. Then we define Γ f as the collection of elements A ∈ P(P ) such that f (A) = 1. A Boolean function f is monotone if and only if Γ f is an access structure. In this case, set min f = min Γ f . For two monotone Boolean functions f, f on the same domain, we define the distance between f and f as dist ( 
Given a Boolean function f : P(P ) → {0, 1} and a set B ⊆ P , we define the restriction of f to B to be the Boolean function f | B : P(P ) → {0, 1} characterized by f | B (A) = f (A ∩ B). In other words, the restriction of the Boolean function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} to the subset B ⊆ P is the Boolean function f | B : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} defined by f | B (x) = f (x ), where x i = x i for all i ∈ B and x i = 0 elsewhere. We have that Γ f | B = cl(min f ∩ P(B)).
If the domain of a Boolean function f is {0, 1} n , we say f is fanin-n. If Φ, g 1 , . . . , g m are Boolean functions and Φ is fanin-m, we can define a Boolean function Φ(g 1 , . . . , g m )  by applying all the outputs of g 1 , . . . , g m to Φ in an orderly manner. For i ∈ P , we denote the i-th input variable by x i . Note that x i can be seen as the monotone Boolean function satisfying Γ x i = T {i} . We now define circuits, formulas and some related concepts.
Definition 8.1. Let Ω be a set of Boolean functions. A circuit S over Ω is a sequence  (g 1 , . . . , g m ) of Boolean functions such that
• The first n Boolean functions are input variables, and
• for every other g j , there exists Φ ∈ Ω and k 1 , . . . ,
A Boolean function g in a circuit is fanout-r if there exist r posterior functions that are computed using g. A formula F over Ω is a circuit over Ω whose fanout of functions is at most 1.
A circuit S = (g 1 , . . . , g m ) computes a Boolean function f if f = g j for some j. We say that a circuit over Ω is monotone if Ω = {∧, ∨}. Similarly, we say it is deMorgan if Ω = {∧, ∨, ¬} and the gate ¬ is only applied to input variables.
Let F f and F g be formulas computing monotone Boolean functions f and g, respectively. Then, F f ∧F g is a formula computing the Boolean function h = f ∧g = max{f, g}, and Γ h = Γ f ∩ Γ g . Similarly, F f ∨ F g is a formula computing the Boolean function h = f ∨ g = min{f, g}, and Γ h = Γ f ∪ Γ g . For every formula F and B ⊆ P , we define F | B as the formula that is obtained by replacing x i by 0 for every i ∈ B. If F computes a function f , then F | B computes f | B .
Bounds on the Size of Formulas and Circuits
The size (resp. leafsize) of a circuit (resp. formula) is defined as the number of non-input Boolean functions (resp. input variables) in it. If f is a Boolean function, we denote by S(f ) (resp. S + (f )) the minimal size of a deMorgan (resp. monotone) circuit computing f . Similarly, we denote by L(f ) (resp. L + (f )) the minimal leafsize of a deMorgan (resp. monotone) formula computing f . Since all results in this article concerning the complexity measure S and L hold verbatim for S + and L + respectively, we state them only for S and L.
We now present bounds as those in 
Submodular Formal Complexity Measures
A nonnegative real-valued function µ defined on the set of monotone Boolean functions in n variables is a submodular formal complexity measure if
For every submodular formal complexity measure µ and for every monotone Boolean function f , L(f ) ≥ µ(f ) [38] . See [30, 38] for more details about submodular formal complexity measures.
Proposition 8.5. Let µ be a submodular formal complexity measure. Then for every two monotone Boolean functions f and f ,
The Razborov's rank measure µ A in Section 7, described in terms of submodular Boolean functions, is also submodular [38] . However, the bound we obtained for µ A for close access structures is much better than the one in the previous proposition. Notice that both λ T and σ T are not submodular functions (see Section C.1 for more details).
The behavior of µ A and L for close monotone Boolean functions is different. Let f and f be two monotone Boolean functions at a distance . Let A and A be matrices over a finite field F that maximize µ A (f ) and µ A (f ). The difference L(f ) − L(f ) can be much bigger than , but the difference µ A (f ) − µ A (f ) is at most .
Conclusions and open problems
The main objective of this work was to discover properties of the access structures that admit efficient secret sharing schemes. We showed that access structures that are close admit secret sharing schemes with similar information ratios. We bounded the difference between information ratios by the distance between the access structures. Our results are constructive, and we presented a formula that, having a secret sharing scheme for a particular access structure, it can be used to obtain schemes for nearby access structures. This formula is simple, but apparently it provides good bounds for both short and large distances (Sections 4.1 and 4.2).
Since access structures that are close admit secret sharing schemes with similar information ratios, in the domain of access structures, we have regions in which the access structures admit secret sharing schemes with low information ratio, for instance around ideal access structures. An interesting line of research is to study of these regions: analyze their distribution and their density in the domain of access structures.
We also provide a combinatorial result that leads to general bounds for the optimal information ratio for access structures whose minimal access structures are close. We translate the search of efficient secret sharing scheme to a combinatorial problem. For graph access structures, there are better constructions in [5, 6] , but for general access structures our approach is still valid.
These techniques are very general, and we extended them to other models of computation, bounding the formula size, the circuit size, and the monotone span program size for monotone Boolean functions. Moreover, we believe that our approach for finding local bounds on for the efficiency of the best scheme can also be useful in information theory and coding theory, in particular in network coding and index coding. Our problem can be set as an information-theoretic problem as follows. Suppose that we have a family of random variables, satisfying certain dependence conditions. Then we modify these conditions. The problem we consider is to construct new random variables satisfying the new conditions, minimizing their entropy.
We extended these results in order to analyze the techniques for finding lower bounds on the optimal information ratio, and we studied their behavior when we add or delete subsets from an access structure. We studied the bounds based on the Shannon inequalities, the Razborov's rank method, the subcritical families method, and submodular formal complexity measures. These bounds are used for other models of computation and information theoretic schemes, and so the results are useful in other areas.
In the information theoretic setting, another interesting problem is to know the effect of small changes in the dependence conditions. For instance, given an access structure, to study the change in the optimal information ratio if we allow some forbidden subsets to have a certain amount of information about the secret. In the family of perfect secret sharing schemes, we cannot capture these situations, and we should study the non-perfect secret sharing schemes. We saw that the optimal information ratio is 1-Lipschitz, but it would be interesting to know if the optimal information ratio is a continuous function. In order to answer this question, we should describe the structure of the scheme with a more general description. The access function [18] , for instance. By now, the continuity of the optimal information ratio is an open problem.
In this section we provide a proof of Lemma 5.4. The main ideas of this proof are from the proof of [5, Lemma 5.4] . We need to introduce the following result, whose proof is direct, and the definition of a coloring of family of subsets.
A coloring of B ⊆ P(P ) with c colors is a mapping µ : P → {1, . . . , c} such that for every A ∈ B there exists u, v ∈ A with µ(u) = µ(v). The existence of the covering is proved by using the probabilistic method (see [1] , for example). We choose r = 2 k k k d k−1 ln n random colorings µ 1 , . . . , µ r of B 1 with 2kd colors. For every coloring µ i , we define C i = {A ⊆ P : A is a maximal monochromatic subset in µ i }. Now we show that C = ∪ r i=1 C i is a (B 1 ,B 1 )-covering with probability at least 1 − 1/(k!).
Let A = {v 1 , . . . , v k } ∈B 1 . We fix i and compute the probability that A ⊆ B for some B ∈ C i , which is equivalent to say that A is monochromatic in µ i . Fix an arbitrary coloring of P \ A. We prove that conditioned on this coloring, the probability that A is monochromatic is at least 1 2(2kd) k−1 . Let B ∈ B 1 with v 1 ∈ B. If B \ {v 1 } is monochromatic, then the color of v 1 must be different from the color of B \ {v 1 }. Thus there are at most d colors that v 1 cannot take. Extending this argument, there are at most kd colors that do not allow A to be monochromatic. Thus the probability that v 1 is colored by one of the remaining 2kd − kd colors is at least half, and the probability that in this case v 2 , . . . , v k are colored in the same color as v 1 is at least 1/(2kd) k−1 . Then A ⊆ B for some B ∈ C i with probability at least 1/(2(2kd) k−1 ).
The probability that A B for every B ∈ C is
Thus, the probability that C is not a (B 1 ,B 1 )-covering is less than n k /n k ≤ 1/k!. In particular, such covering exists.
B An Alternative Definition of Secret Sharing
In this section we present another definition of secret sharing. This definition and the one in Section 2 are equivalent (see [3] ). In this definition, we assume that secrets are chosen in K according to a certain probability distribution µ . Then the distribution scheme Σ and µ determine a random variable S i for every i ∈ P . For every
The Shannon entropy of the random variable S A is denoted by H(S A ). In addition, for such random variables, one can consider the conditional entropy H(S A |S B ) = H(S A∪B ) − H(S B ), the mutual information I(S A :S B ) = H(S A ) − H(S A |S B ), and the conditional mutual information I(S A :S B |S C ) = H(S A |S C ) − H(S A |S B∪C ). For an introduction to information theory, see [14] .
Definition B.1. Let K be a finite set of secrets, where |K| ≥ 2. A distribution scheme (Π, µ) with domain of secrets K together with a random variable S 0 on K is a secret sharing scheme realizing an access structure Γ if the following requirements hold for every A ⊂ P :
• If A / ∈ Γ then I(S 0 :S A ) = 0. Definition 2.3 and Definition B.1 are equivalent, and so the access structure determined according to one definition coincides with the one determined according to the other definition. The access structure of a secret sharing scheme is independent of the distribution of the secrets. That is, if a scheme realizes an access structure with respect to one distribution on the secrets, then it realizes the access structure with respect to any other distribution with the same support (see [3] for more details).
The results in Section 4 can be extended to secret sharing schemes defined according to Definition B.1, but there are some details that have to be taken into account. It is not possible to perform the OR operation of two secret sharing schemes with different probability distributions on the secrets. Also, it is not possible to perform an AND of secret sharing schemes whose secret distribution is not uniform. If we restrict the study to the secret sharing schemes in which the secret is chosen according to the uniform probability distribution, then we can define ANDs and ORs in a straightforward way.
In the information theoretic context the size of the shares is measured in terms of the entropy of the secret and the shares by means of max i∈P H(S i )/H(S 0 ). If we suppose that the distribution of the secret is uniform on K, then log |K| = H(S 0 ). Then since log |S i | ≥ H(S i ) for every i ∈ P , for every secret sharing scheme Σ on P , σ(Σ) ≥ max i∈P H(S i )/H(S 0 ).
C Proofs of Section 6
This section is dedicated to the proof of Lemma 6.6 and Theorem 6.7. First we present a technical lemma, whose proof is straightforward.
Let A ⊆ P and let p ∈ P \ A. By property p1) of Lemma C.1,
which is nonnegative by property p3) of Lemma C.1.
which is non-negative by property p3) of Lemma C.1. Note that ∆ h (p:q|A∪{p 0 }) = ∆ g (p:q|A), and we already proved that ∆ g (p:q|A) ≥ 0 in g1).
It concludes the proof that S 3 and S 4 are polymatroids. Now we prove that indeed S 3 is a Γ 1 ∪Γ 2 -polymatroid and S 4 is a Γ 1 ∩Γ 2 -polymatroid. 
The previous example shows access structures for which σ T does not satisfy the submodularity property. For these access structures, σ T and κ T (the bound defined analogously from κ) coincide, and they also coincide with λ T q, for all and for all finite field F q with q > 4. Therefore κ T and λ T q, are not submodular either.
D Proofs of Section 8
In this section we show the proofs of the Propositions 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4. First we give formulas and complexity measures for particular families of Boolean functions. We start with the Boolean functions associated to the access structures T A , R A , S A defined in Section 3, and we proceed with the restriction f | B of some Boolean function f to B ∈ P(P ). The functions f T A and F A admit the formulas ∧ i∈A x i and ∨ i∈P \A x i of sizes |A| and n − |A|, respectively. Since S A = T A ∩ F A , we have that (∧ i∈A x i ) ∧ ∨ i∈P \A x i is a formula for f S A of size n. We now consider the restriction f | B : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} of a Boolean function f . By applying the restriction x i = 0 for all i / ∈ B to a minimal monotone (or deMorgan) circuit (resp. formula) for f , and removing redundant input variables and Boolean functions, we get a circuit (resp. formula) for f | B . Therefore, S( f | B ) ≤ S(f ) and Now note that cl (min S A ∩ Γ )) = T A ∩ i / ∈A:A∪{i}∈Γ T {i} , hence this access structure admits the formula ( i∈A x i ) ∧ i / ∈A:A∪{i}∈Γ x i , which has size at most n. The rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 8.2. The result for S can be proved in a similar way.
Proof of Proposition 8.4. Let C be a (min f \ min f , min f ∩ min f )-covering, and take A ∈ min f . In this case, A ∈ min f if and only if there exists B ∈ C such that A ∈ P(B).
Hence min f ∩ min f = B∈C (min f ∩ P(B)). Now, since min f = (min f ∩ min f ) ∪ (min f \ min f ),
Hence, if H A is the formula for T A described above, the formula
The result for S is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 8.5. Let Γ = Γ f and Γ = Γ f . Let g and h be the monotone Boolean functions associated to the access structures ∩ A∈max Γ\Γ F A and ∪ A∈min Γ \Γ T A , respectively. Since f = (f ∧ g) ∨ h and µ is submodular,
Since µ is submodular, the size of the monotone formulas described above for T A and 
